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The magnitude of the crisis caught Western
economies off guard, where, despite the large global
imbalances that were accruing, a buoyant macroeco-
nomic context prevailed. In the United States, the
boom was sustained by an asset bubble and a very low
savings rate, which led to the accumulation of trade
deficits financed by China and raw materials suppli-
ers. Europe was experiencing a moderate recovery
from a period of low growth and was in the middle of
painful attempts to reform its welfare state and its
rigid labour markets, to address its endangered public
finances and its disappointing long-term growth per-
formance. The crisis has put these adjustments on
hold as all governments have implemented massive
fiscal and monetary stimulus packages. As a result the
world economy may emerge from the crisis with the
same unresolved imbalances and structural problems
that prevailed before the crisis, aggravated by the mas-
sive accumulation of government debt in response to
the crisis. 
This year’s EEAG Report addresses the challenges for
the developed world to exit the crisis without compro-
mising its long-term prospects. 
In addition to the traditional chapter discussing the
immediate macroeconomic outlook, we document
the adverse effects the crisis had on trust in financial
markets. This factor will help determine whether the
world economy can be rebuilt on a more stable foun-
dation; indeed we document that the crisis has had
substantial adverse consequences on the level of
trust, which leaves us in doubt as to whether the
financial sector will be able to resume its activity at
the pre-crisis level. Chapter 3 discusses the conse-
quences of the large deficits of major developed
countries for the sustainability of public finances in
the long run. Chapter 4 discusses the impact of the
crisis on the long-term sustainability of the US econ-
omy in terms of government accounts and the exter-
nal balance. The crisis has worsened the problems
already existing in both areas. Chapter 5 discusses
the impact of the crisis on the euro area. We argue
that the euro has shielded member countries from
severe balance of payment crises. On the other hand,
the euro area faces tough challenges at its periphery
as candidate countries face looming balance of pay-
ment crises, while developments in Greece suggest
that the credibility premium of membership is con-
ditional on sound economic policies. 
Chapter 1: Macroeconomic outlook
After the deep economic recession during the winter
of 2008/2009 triggered by a US-led financial crisis,
many countries went through a stabilisation period
and now seem to have entered a recovery phase.
Global monetary and fiscal policies have prevented an
even worse outcome and have helped bring about the
current recovery. This has been reinforced by a posi-
tive inventory cycle.
However, we expect a number of factors to dampen
the recovery in the developed world. First, the restruc-
turing process within the banking sector is far from
complete. Credit constraints may grow tighter during
the recovery as an increased demand for funds may
come up against banks’ reluctance to extend loans.
Second, capacity utilisation is low, and investment will
not pick up until this margin of slack has been
reduced. Third, the labour market situation will not
only remain tense, but will slightly deteriorate further
– dampening private consumption. Finally, fiscal pol-
icy stimulus cannot be prolonged in face of a quickly
deteriorating fiscal balance.
Economic conditions will be more favourable in
emerging economies, which we expect to become the
growth engines for the world economy.
After having experienced a decline unprecedented
since World War II –– by minus 2.3 percent last year –
we expect world GDP to increase by 2.3 in 2010.
Hence, world economic growth will stay below poten-
tial. Inflation will accelerate somewhat but also stay
well below its long-term average. 
In the United States the deepest recession since World
War II has come to an end. GDP in 2009 ended up2.6 percent lower than in 2008. Private consumption
overall fell by 0.6 percent in 2009, whereas the private
saving rate has been steadily increasing. The
strongest negative growth contribution last year came
from investment. The domestic problems led to a
sharp fall in the demand for foreign goods and ser-
vices over the year. The decline in exports, on the
other hand, was clearly less pronounced. Con-
sequently, the US trade balance was able to improve
substantially, thus contributing to a reduction in
global imbalances. After approximately three years,
real-estate prices stopped falling in mid-2009. To a
large extent, this development can be traced back to
the massive subsidies and tax reliefs granted by the
US government. Only when state support runs out,
however, will it be possible to judge whether the real-
estate market recovery is sustainable. 
Although the recession has ended, the US economy
still has to remedy its structural problems. US con-
sumers have been living beyond their means for too
long. To allow for a way back to sustainable growth,
US consumers are in a process of curtailing their con-
sumption. This process has already set in but needs to
continue during our forecasting horizon. Further-
more, although the worse seems to be over for the
banking industry, a continuation of write-offs is high-
ly likely and government intervention in the banking
and real estate sectors will consequently remain high.
On top of that, fiscal sustainability is an issue that will
stay on the agenda for years to come.
After having been hit the hardest amongst the large
economies in the world during winter 2008/2009, the
economic recovery in Japan set in already in the sec-
ond quarter of last year. The most important drivers
for the mild recovery were foreign trade and private
consumption. However, this will not prevent the
annual growth rate for 2009 from falling to – 5.3 per-
cent. Japan will continue its recovery in the short run,
but its medium term prospects are rather bleak.
Exports will remain the main driver of growth this
and next year. The Japanese export economy benefits
from its geographical proximity to Asian emerging
markets, which are experiencing a surge in domestic
demand. 
Over the summer China was able to recover to near-
ly pre-crisis growth levels. To a large extent this was
caused by a strong increase in investment activity ini-
tiated by huge fiscal and monetary stimulus pro-
grammes of the government. The short-term eco-
nomic prospects for China remain quite positive.
This can be attributed especially to government pol-
icy, which succeeded – with a massive stimulus pro-
gramme – in strengthening its economy without rely-
ing on outside impulses. The programme is sched-
uled to expire by the middle of this year and will not
be fully offset thereafter by impulses from the rest of
the world. From a structural perspective, economic
policy is increasingly putting a burden on the
Chinese economy by aggravating unbalanced eco-
nomic developments. In recent years gross capital
formation has accounted for 40 percent of GDP,
against only 35 percent from private consumption.
In a typical developed country, these figures are
around 20 percent and 65 percent, respectively. With
its clear focus on investment activity in large, often
state-controlled, enterprises, the stimulus package
will raise the share of investment further. In the
medium term, many of these investments may prove
to be misdirected and unprofitable, and may lead to
overcapacities in some sectors. 
With the sole exception of Poland, all European Union
member countries went through a deep recession last
year. A comparison of the peak in the first quarter of
2008 with the trough in the second quarter of 2009
reveals that the European Union – and with it the
euro area – contracted by 5.1 percent over a period of
five quarters. The three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania – were especially hard hit by the eco-
nomic crisis and saw their GDP drop by approxi-
mately 20 percent. 
Although the decline in private consumption and
investment continued, the European Union started
to recover during the second half of 2009. Of the
western and southern European member countries,
only Cyprus, Greece, Spain and the United King-
dom were still in recession in the third quarter of last
year. Similar to the US’s, the European recovery is
fragile. Although the prospects of firms have
improved, problems within the banking sector
remain. This is likely to lead to a more restrictive
credit supply which, together with continued under-
utilisation of production factors, will prevent a
strong recovery of investment. Furthermore, wors-
ening labour market conditions, small wage increas-
es and somewhat higher inflation will lead to a
reduction in real disposable income, thereby reduc-
ing consumption growth. Finally, we also expect fis-
cal stimulus to be transitory, as in the US. Hence,
according to our forecasts, after having sunk by
4.0 percent last year, GDP growth will rise to 1.0 per-
cent this year.
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Mainly as a consequence of the drop in oil prices,
inflation rates in the European Union fell until sum-
mer last year. The increase in prices will accelerate
somewhat on the whole, but – given low capacity util-
isation rates and stable inflation expectations – remain
restrained. The increase in consumer prices will be
1.2 percent in the European Union in 2009 (after
0.7 percent in 2008). In the euro area, the inflation
rate will equal 0.9 percent in 2010 (after 0.3 percent
last year). The increased indebtedness of European
governments, caused by large fiscal stimulus pro-
grammes, together with slowly rising interest rates will
raise the debt burden. Government interest expenses
are certain to rise in the years to come and crowd out
other types of government spending. This is already a
good reason for governments to prepare and commu-
nicate exit and consolidation strategies to return to
sound and sustainable public finances again. More
importantly, such strategies are needed to strengthen
overall macroeconomic stability and to guarantee that
any future crisis can again be relieved by appropriate
fiscal policy measures. 
To summarise, our assessment of the macroeconomic
outlook is that while policy has been successful in pre-
venting a new great depression and a deflationary spi-
ral, the recovery remains fragile and future growth
prospects are clouded by structural problems. Many
of these structural problems were present before the
crisis, but some new structural problems may have
been spawned by the crisis itself, especially in the
financial sector. Chapter 2 of this report discusses one
of them, namely the collapse of trust. 
Chapter 2: A trust-driven financial crisis
A key ingredient in understanding the financial crisis
is a dramatic drop in trust towards financial interme-
diaries, bankers and financial markets. While many
conventional factors have contributed to the emer-
gence and propagation of the financial crisis, they
alone cannot fully explain the sudden collapse in eco-
nomic activity that took place after October 2008. 
We argue that starting in summer 2008 something
very important was destroyed: the trust that interme-
diaries have in each other and that investors have in
the financial industry. Trust – the belief a person has
that a counterpart in a transaction will not take
advantage of him – while normally ignored in stan-
dard economic analysis, is crucial in many transac-
tions and certainly in those involving financial
exchanges. When trust is missing, financing disap-
pears and economic activity suddenly stops. This is
what happened in October 2008 and the subsequent
months. The data show that the percentage of people
that reported having full trust in banks, brokers,
mutual funds or the stock market, which was as high
as 40 percent in the late 1970s and around 30 percent
just before the crisis hit, dropped to 5 percent and has
not recovered since. Similarly, we find that for the first
time since the data on trust exist, self-reported trust in
banks and bankers has fallen below the trust people
have in other, randomly selected, people.
This marked fall in trust was largely provoked by the
revelation of the opportunistic behaviour that the
unfolding of the crisis brought to light, of which the
Bernard Madoff fraud is emblematic, and has con-
tributed to casting a dark light on the whole finan-
cial industry. Indeed, we show that in states where
the number of victims of the Madoff fraud was
higher, the level of trust towards banks, bankers,
brokers and mutual funds has fallen more than in
states with a lower concentration of Madoff victims.
The destruction of trust inherited from the crisis has
important implications for the future of financial
markets, including the demand for financial prod-
ucts and investors’ portfolio choices. Most likely it
will result in:
• A drop in investments in risky assets. Such assets
lend themselves more easily to opportunistic
behaviour than simpler securities. Thus, portfolios
will likely be twisted markedly towards safer secu-
rities and away from stocks.
• A drop in the demand for complex financial instru-
ments with ambiguous returns. These are assets
that are more exposed to the risk of fraud and con-
sequently more easily placed among high-trust
investors. When trust dwindles the demand for
these instruments declines and investors revert to
“familiar” instruments
• Less diversified portfolios and a greater share of
domestic assets, the latter being perceived as more
familiar and trustworthy. On the other hand,
investors will entertain relations with multiple
intermediaries in order to diversify the risk of
opportunistic behaviour by reducing exposure to
each one of them. Both effects are costly: the first
because one loses the benefits of diversification,
the second because of the cost of setting and main-
taining multiple relations. 
• Less reliance on and delegation to intermediaries.
Our evidence shows that a fundamental ingredientin the intensity of financial delegation is the level
of investors’ trust. Since delegation is all the more
necessary the more one invests in sophisticated
securities, also through this channel there should
be a move towards simpler portfolios. 
• Finally, since an insurance contract is itself a
financial contract and as such is prone to the
opportunistic behaviour of the insurance compa-
ny, the fall in trust should also affect the demand
for insurance. 
To sum up, the fall in trust towards all segments of the
financial industry will give rise to a generalised flight
from financial trades, particularly those that are
severely exposed to opportunistic behaviour.
Insofar as it results in a shift towards safer assets, it
will push up the equity premium and make equity
financing more expensive. This may have conse-
quences for fast-growing and innovative firms that
depend more heavily on this type of financing.
Similarly, if the increased mistrust results in a pref-
erence for instruments with shorter maturity, it will
raise the cost of long-term financing, hampering
projects with high yields but longer maturities.
Because of this it is important to understand how
trust in financial markets and intermediaries can be
rebuilt. The chapter examines two avenues: The first
relies on enhanced regulation; the second on a reac-
tion by the industry.
The regulatory approach, so far the only one that has
been followed to rebuild trust, is to raise the strength
of financial regulation. This approach has been the
subject of several of the recent G20 meetings and of
the proposals that are being discussed at the Financial
Stability Board. Many of the proposals that are under
scrutiny go beyond the purpose of rebuilding trust
and will most likely affect the perceived solvency of
the intermediaries, to lower the chance of future cri-
sis. But these measures are likely to have little impact
on trust.
From the viewpoint of the regulation of investors’
relations with financial intermediaries, the most rele-
vant proposal that can help recover trust is the cre-
ation of the consumer protection agency proposed by
the Obama administration. The agency would oversee
consumer financial products, which have been regu-
lated in the past but whose oversight was exposed as
lax. One may also mention the creation in the US of a
Financial Fraud Enforcement task force to combat
financial crimes. 
Because these initiatives are both specifically aimed at
protecting investors from abuses they may actually
contribute to rebuilding trust. But there are also rea-
sons to believe that by themselves these interventions
may have limited impact. 
The alternative strategy to rebuild trust relies on the
idea that losing investors’ trust is very costly for the
financial industry. If it is costly, intermediaries could
be expected to have strong incentives to take actions
to re-build their reputation and re-gain the trust of
their customers. Unfortunately there are no easy
recipes on how A may convince B to reconsider his
opinion about the trustworthiness of A. The chapter
examines three possible mechanisms.
• A rating system that even the most (financially)
illiterate investor can understand. It consists of rat-
ing intermediaries on their ability to offer trust-
worthy services and to limit incentives to exploit
conflicts of interest at the expense of the investor.
The rating system, offered in an easily understand-
able metric (e.g., a number from 0 to 10), would
allow all investors to distinguish intermediaries on
the basis of their integrity, thus reducing the scope
for opportunistic behaviour. It would de facto pro-
vide intermediaries with incentives to raise their
trustworthiness by transferring punishment power
to the investors. 
• A trust-based compensation scheme. A second,
more direct mechanism to rebuild trust is to pro-
vide incentives to build it. If the compensation of
the investor’s manager depends on the level of trust
investors have in their asset manager, the latter
have strong incentives to behave in a trustworthy
manner and this, perhaps slowly, will raise the
investors’ trust and their willingness to invest. 
• Promoting investors’ financial education. A third
strategy is to take actions that promote the finan-
cial education of the investors – for instance by
lobbying the government to have financial educa-
tion taught at (public) school, making financial
education material, certified by third parties, avail-
able to investors, and other such measures. An
intermediary that promotes financial education
signals its intention to be willing to deal with expe-
rienced and sophisticated investors, with enough
nous not to fall victim of financial abuses and dis-
torted advice. This should contribute to improving
investors’ trust. 
Needless to say, investment in financial education
pays off in the very long run; however the returns to
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the intermediary in terms of increased trustworthi-
ness may be more immediate if the intermediary’s
commitment to transfer power to the investor through
this channel is credible. Credibility would be
enhanced if the sponsoring of financial education
programmes is part of a broader policy aimed at lim-
iting intermediaries’ incentives to deceive investors,
such as the trust-based compensation scheme and the
bank fairness index. 
All the above measures endeavour, from different
angles, to limit the scope for intermediaries’ oppor-
tunist behaviour. In each case, the policy is not
imposed; adhering to it is left to the discretion of the
intermediary. However, we argue, there is no automat-
ic mechanism that guarantees that intermediaries will
agree to adopt these policies voluntarily. Rather, if
dishonest behaviour is dominant among intermedi-
aries, even the honest ones may be unwilling to adopt
these measures on their own and help the economy
move to a better outcome where competition drives
out dishonest behaviour. We also argue that regula-
tion by itself, without the involvement of the interme-
diaries, may fail to restore trust. However, regulatory
agencies may play a very important role in coordinat-
ing the selection of the “honest” equilibrium. For
instance, using moral suasion to persuade even a
small but important number of intermediaries to
“play the honest game” may be enough to trigger a
response of the same type by the dishonest ones and
move the whole industry equilibrium. 
The next chapter discusses long-run issues associated
with the substantial increase in public debt that is cur-
rently taking place in most developed countries.
Chapter 3: From Fiscal Rescue to Global Debt 
In just over a year, the world has moved from a con-
sensus that the financial and economic crisis necessi-
tated a large and co-ordinated fiscal stimulus to seri-
ous concerns about the size of the public debt. 
There was certainly a consensus at the end of 2008
that a fiscal stimulus package was needed. The IMF
argued that the “optimal fiscal package should be
timely, large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective
and sustainable”. The European Council of the EU
agreed a “European Economic Recovery Programme”
(EERP) in December 2008, which called for a discre-
tionary fiscal stimulus of at least 1.5 percent of GDP.
And in April 2009, the G20 stated: “We are undertak-
ing an unprecedented and concerted fiscal expansion,
which will save or create millions of jobs which would
otherwise have been destroyed.”
And there have certainly been large increases in pub-
lic deficits throughout the EU – and elsewhere – lead-
ing to considerable rises in the stock of outstanding
public debt as a percentage of GDP. In 2009, the total
deficit in the EU was around 6-7 percent of GDP, and
it is expected to rise further in 2010. There has been a
corresponding increase in outstanding debt, rising to
around 72 percent of GDP in 2009, with further
increases certain in 2010 and beyond. 
However, there are wide variations across countries,
both in the size of the deficits in 2009 and 2010, and
in the level of outstanding debt. For example, the UK,
Ireland and Latvia have particularly high deficits,
though in all three cases their outstanding debt is rel-
atively moderate as a proportion of GDP. Italy,
Greece and Belgium have much higher outstanding
debt, because all three have had high deficits for sev-
eral years.
These high deficits have generally not reflected dis-
cretionary changes by EU governments. While most
governments introduced a discretionary fiscal stimu-
lus in 2008 and 2009, these were small relative to the
overall deficits. The form of these discretionary
changes (and even their sign) has varied considerably
between countries. 
There is some empirical evidence that a fiscal stimulus
has a positive effect on output, although there are
many problems in measuring the effect, so that the
size of the fiscal multiplier is not known with any cer-
tainty. In any case, there is little reason to suppose
that effects estimated on historic data are likely to be
valid in the midst of a recession. This is particularly
the case when interest rates are effectively at zero, and
the economy is shaken by an ongoing financial and
economic crisis, when there may be very large multi-
pliers for government spending. Indeed, recent theo-
retical and empirical work suggests that spending
expansions and tax cuts supporting current demand
may be quite valuable under such circumstances. 
The scope for reducing deficits depends crucially on
the rate of economic growth achieved over the next
few years, and the degree to which real public spend-
ing can be curtailed. For example, a simple calculation
suggests that if spending is kept constant in real termsthroughout the EU, then economic growth of around
2 percent would see the aggregate EU deficit reduced
to zero by around 2017, with outstanding debt reach-
ing a peak of around 100 percent of GDP. Of course,
some countries would need a higher growth rate to
achieve fiscal balance within this period. 
There are costs to maintaining high debt levels,
though these should not be blown out of proportion.
Especially at low interest rates, the cost of servicing
debt is of the order of 3 percent of GDP, though
again there is considerable variation across member
states. Two factors could increase this cost in the short
to medium term. First, interest rates are likely to rise.
Second, public debt appears increasingly risky to the
market, which implies that higher risk premia could
be charged.
Although these risk premia are currently not large
for most countries, they may grow in the near future,
reflecting doubts about debt sustainability – recent
developments in Greece suggest such a possibility is
not so remote. Governments must therefore define
credible strategies to reduce deficits over the medi-
um term. 
A key concern with designing such strategies is that
anticipation of future tax rises and/or spending cuts
may hamper the economy immediately, as individuals
perceive their lifetime income to be lower, and firms
anticipate a contraction in demand. This need not be
the case. On the contrary, there are ways to design
debt consolidation strategies that actually support
current stimuli. 
One way of reconciling the need for a credible
deficit-reduction strategy with the need to avoid
harming a fragile economy is to announce rises in
taxes on spending – such as VAT – to take effect
from some future period, say in one year’s time. This
would induce individuals to bring spending forward,
which would provide a temporary stimulus to the
economy. 
Another way consists of announcing well-designed
measures bringing government spending on goods
and services below trend, to be implemented suffi-
ciently far in the future as to avoid the risk of
exposing the economy to additional deflationary
pressures when policy interest rates are still close to
zero. Provided that they are not implemented too
early, future spending cuts are beneficial to the
recovery, as they contain the rise in long-term inter-
est rates (as well as attenuating concerns about debt
sustainability).
A final point concerns coordination. The attempts to
stimulate the economy benefited from coordination
efforts. For an individual country, a stimulus to
spending might be largely reflected in increased
imports, creating demand for goods and services pro-
duced elsewhere. A coordinated policy reduces this
risk. In principle, the same argument also applies
(with a different sign) to fiscal adjustment. If all coun-
tries implemented a contractionary fiscal adjustment
simultaneously and independently, without internalis-
ing negative output spillovers abroad, this would be
likely to hamper the economic recovery. This adverse
effect would be reduced if such policies were intro-
duced in a coordinated way, possibly leading to more
gradualism. 
However, coordinated gradualism should not inter-
fere with the adoption of measures necessary to pre-
serve stability. The worst-hit countries or the coun-
tries with the most fragile public finances should
adjust upfront and most deeply, to prevent the spread-
ing of concerns about fiscal sustainability. If gradual-
ism in the name of coordination feeds doubts about
debt consolidation, then no coordination is a much
better option.
Among all developed countries, the country subjected
to the largest imbalances not only in terms of public
finances but also in terms of its external position is
the United States. Chapter 4 discusses the issues asso-
ciated with US adjustment. 
Chapter 4: US adjustment needs
Given the size of US fiscal and external deficits, a cen-
tral question is whether the US economy is on a sus-
tainable path and to what extent the answer to this
question has changed during the recent macro-finan-
cial crises. 
We first note that a current account deficit does not
necessarily have to be reversed in order to guaran-
tee sustainability. In principle, the same is true for a
fiscal deficit. This depends on how large the econo-
my’s growth rate is relative to the interest rate on its
debt. If the growth rate is larger than the interest
rate, the size of the debt relative to GDP shrinks by
more than the increase in debt due to additional
interest. 
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Before the financial crisis, the forecast for the coming
decade implied clear improvement in the US fiscal
balance. The projections of the Congressional Budget
Office made just before the crisis implied deficits
would move into surpluses and debt to GDP ratios
would fall from 2013. However, the longer run fore-
casts were already much less rosy before the crisis.
Due to aging and increased costs in health care, the
federal governments spending on Medicare, Medicaid
and Social Security were forecasted to grow at an
accelerating speed, implying a glaring and alarming
inconsistency between government outlays and the
electorates’ willingness to pay.
The CBO forecasts changed dramatically during the
macro-financial crisis of 2009. In August 2009, the
forecast was that the US government debt would
increase very rapidly. The increasing trend in the debt
as a share of GDP during the 1980s is back and per-
haps even stronger than before.
Half way into 2009, the forecast had changed to an
unprecedented deficit of 11.2 percent. This is almost
twice as large as the previous record deficit of 6.0 per-
cent in 1983. Furthermore, the CBO forecast implies
that the deficits in 2010 and 2011 will also be above
the previous record.
Furthermore, while GDP growth is projected to
rebound substantially in 2012, the budget deficit is
not expected to go back to the previous track. Rather
than turning back to black by the middle of the
decade, the forecast now points at deficits in the order
of 3 percent of GDP for the whole period. Part of this
can be explained by the debt build-up, implying high-
er interest costs. It is, however, alarming that also
when removing the interest payments, the budget is
2 percent of GDP weaker than before the crisis.
Before the crisis, important indicators pointed
towards an unsustainable fiscal situation in the long
run, i.e. for the period after the current decade. In the
medium run, however, there was no direct danger.
After the crisis, also the situation in the shorter run is
now alarming.
Regarding the foreign balance we note that there is
a substantial discrepancy between different ways of
measuring the current account. In particular the
returns, including capital gains on the very large
stock of foreign gross assets, are underestimated in
some official calculations of the current account.
The US has foreign gross assets with a value sub-
stantially larger than its yearly GDP. Furthermore,
it has for decades earned a higher return on its
assets than it pays on its liabilities. This return priv-
ilege allows the US to run a trade balance deficit of
about 4 percent of GDP without increasing its net
foreign debt.
If the return privilege remains, debt build-up is not
going to force the US into large adjustments and dol-
lar depreciation. In this respect, the current account
deficit is not a big worry. But we do not know why the
US enjoys such a return privilege. It seems reasonable
that part of it could be explained by a superior finan-
cial sector in the US. If so, the financial crisis may
well eliminate part of this superiority, which could
lead to lower returns and a lower ability of US citi-
zens to generate income by taking on foreign risk. If
the return privilege were to vanish, quite dramatic and
fast structural adjustments would need to be under-
taken, which would have a large impact on the world
economy and the value of the dollar.
The final chapter discusses the implications of the cri-
sis for the performance of the euro area. 
Chapter 5: Implications of the crisis for the euro area
The current crisis has led many analysts to re-assess
the role of the euro. At face value, the euro area has
done relatively well in avoiding the massive financial
crisis of Anglo-Saxon countries. Does the crisis
prove the virtues of the euro, or can it be a source of
tensions that strain the viability of the monetary
union? 
We acknowledge that membership of the euro area
has helped to eliminate the possibility of a “twin cri-
sis”, i.e. a joint banking and balance of payment cri-
sis, in the member countries. Such crises may occur
when the liabilities of financial institutions are
denominated in foreign currency. During such a crisis,
expectations of a sudden drop in the exchange rate
reduce the solvency of those institutions, which makes
it more likely that a run may occur. To the extent that
these crises are self-fulfilling rather than driven by
fundamentals, the euro is unambiguously beneficial.
It reduces their likelihood because member countries
borrow in euros and even if they were to borrow in
foreign currency, it is unlikely that a debt overhang in
a particular country could trigger a sharp deprecia-
tion of the euro, as that country only accounts for a
small part of the entire euro area economy. On the other hand, the crisis brings about some sce-
narios that may be problematic. One such scenario is
a rapid, excessive appreciation of the euro reflecting a
flight out of US assets. Another is a balance-of-pay-
ments crisis in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. Despite the fact that these countries are not
members of the monetary union, they are expected to
join some day, and financial and macroeconomic
fragility there affects the euro area. While we consider
the first scenario unlikely, although by no means
impossible (given our assessment of future US adjust-
ment needs), the second one may leave policymakers
in the euro area with tough choices. These may
include a bail-out of some Eastern countries that may
weaken the euro area, an early entry of Eastern appli-
cants at inadequate parities and under bad macroeco-
nomic conditions, or a balance-of-payments crisis in
the East that may delay entry. 
Finally, we document a number of asymmetries and
imbalances between the core members of the mone-
tary union, in particular with respect to inflation dif-
ferentials and net foreign asset positions. It is unclear
whether the crisis exacerbates or dampens those
asymmetries. But the evolution of spreads in govern-
ment yields during the crisis suggests that the credi-
bility of the euro area is not absolute. It is plausible
that the asymmetries, while not accentuated by the
crisis, undermine the credibility of the currency zone,
which itself becomes more of an issue in times of cri-
sis. That is, a shrinking economic activity may make
imbalances such as low competitiveness, high trade
deficits or high public debt more problematic, which
increases the likelihood of an exit from the euro area
or of a default on public debt. The rise of the spreads
during the crisis suggests that over a ten-year horizon
and for a peripheral country, markets do not consider
those possibilities as rare events. 
One case in point is Greece: in December 2009, its
sovereign debt was downgraded to BBB. The spreads
shot up again as debt has grown well beyond 100
percent of GDP, while low competitiveness due to
past cumulated inflation differentials makes it diffi-
cult to exit the recession. Possible scenarios include
outright default, exiting the euro area, or a bail-out
from core euro countries. None of those scenarios is
favourable for the euro. A bail-out can be especially
problematic if it fails to prevent contagion to other,
much larger economies with a public debt overhang,
such as Belgium or Italy, for which a bail-out would
be too costly. 
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